Corporate Culture // 2008 - Present
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Dan Friedman
,
Nirvikar Singh
We conduct laboratory experiments with human subjects, in order to address key issues regarding adaptive change in organizational culture and interactions across cul- tures, with special reference to IT services engagements. The experiments involve a team game in which two players in different locations look at the same master set of photographs arranged (in different order) on their computer screens. One person must use an instant messaging system to describe the photo so the teammate can cor- rectly identify it. Players’ rewards decrease in the total time elapsed. We test the effectiveness of various interventions, including rotating assignments and cross-cultural training, among other variables. The project goals are to provide insights that can im- prove the organizational architectures and business processes that govern IT services engagements, by identifying factors that enhance positive adaptive change in organiza- tional culture and interactions across cultures, through faster learning and innovations in organizational architectures and dynamics.
Distributive Justice // 2007 - Present
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Ryan Oprea
,
Alessandra Cassar
,
Paul Viotti
<p> Read the <a href=`http://www.ucsc.edu/news_events/text.asp?pid=2121`>article</a> posted on UCSC's website. </p>
Electronic Market Design // 2006 - Present // NSF IIS-0527770
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Dan Friedman
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Nirvikar Singh
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Steven Gjerstad,
James C. Cox
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Vjollca Sadiraj,
Chris Campbell
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An Experiment on the Core
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Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment
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eBay Sellers
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A laboratory Investigation of Deferral Options
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Markups in Double Auction Markets
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Financial Engineering and Rationality: Experimental Evidence Based on the Monty Hall Problem
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Supported 2006-09 by NSF grant IIS-0527770, this project explores how humans and computerized agents interact in various one- and two-sided market formats. Asynchronous (real-time) interactions are emphasized.
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Landscape Dynamics // 2005 - Present // SES-0436509
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Dan Friedman
,
Ralph Abraham
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Paul Viotti
Main website: http://www.vismath.org/research/landscapedyn “Adaptive landscape†is a classic metaphor in theoretical biology. The landscape is defined over an abstract space of potential biological traits, and successful species are represented by peaks, i.e., trait combinations that have the highest fitness. We develop the landscape idea mathematically, drawing on insights and techniques from dynamical systems theory, agent-based systems, evolutionary game theory, and fluid dynamics. The abstract space represents possible choices (in one or more dimensions) by individuals, and the social state is the distribution of actual choices. Then an individual’s payoff is a landscape whose shape depends on the social state. Individuals respond to the landscape and seek higher payoff. As they do so, the distribution of choices changes in continuous time, and therefore the landscape also changes. New peaks representing high payoff can appear, and old peaks can disappear, or flatten into plateaus, or move. Thus an application produces a dynamic interplay between social state and landscape.
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Networked Markets // 2004 - Present // SBR-0351801
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Dan Friedman
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Alessandra Cassar
,
Patricia Higino Schneider
A central theoretical proposition in economics is that frictionless markets perform at 100% efficiency, and require only trivial links between buyers and sellers. Actual markets, however, face moderate to severe trading frictions, and rely on various sorts of buyer-seller links. We introduce two important frictions: possible cheating (e.g., a seller might ship an item of lower quality) and hidden trading opportunities (e.g., a buyer might not be aware of a low cost supplier). We will then introduce networks of links among traders, and examine the impact on market performance, including efficiency, prices, volume, and profit distribution. As suggested by ratings in on-line auctions or by the role of immigrant networks in international trade, the links among network members spread information, e.g., the identity of cheaters or the location of low cost sellers. Such links may boost market performance by fostering trust (based on reputation) and unifying trade. We will choose the network links in early series of experiments and allow traders to build their own networks in later series.